Mitchell V. Wisconsin Essay Example For Students

Mitchell V. Wisconsin Essay Word Count: 3746On June 11, 1993, the United State Supreme Court upheld Wisconsin?s penalty enhancement law, which imposes harsher sentences on criminals who ?intentionally select the person against whom the crimeis committed..because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person.? Chief Justice Rehnquist deliverd the opinion of the unanimous Court. This paper argues against the decision, and will attempt to prove the unconstitutionality of such penalty enhancement laws. On the evening of October 7, 1989, Mitchell and a group of young black men attacked and severely beat a lone white boy. The group had just finished watching the film ?Mississippi Burning?, in which a young black boy was, while praying, beaten by a white man. After the film, the group moved outside and Mitchell asked if they felt ?hyped up to move on some white people?. When the white boy approached Mitchell said, ?You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy, Go get him.? The boy was left unconscious, and remained in a coma for four days. Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery, which carries a two year maximum sentence. The Wisconsin jury, however, found that because Mitchell selected his victim based on race, the penalty enhancement law allowed Mitchell to be sentenced to up to seven years. The jury sentenced Mitchell to four years, twice the maximum for the crime he committed without the penalty enhancement law. The U.S. Supreme Court?s ruling was faulty, and defied a number of precedents. The Wisconsin law is unconstitutional, and is essentially unenforceable. This paper primarily focuses on the constitutional arguments against Chief Justice Rehnquist?s decision and the statute itself, but will also consider the practical implications of the Wisconsin law, as well as a similar law passed under the new federal crime bill (Cacas, 32). The Wisconsin law and the new federal law are based on a model created by the Anti- Defemation League in response to a rising tide of hate-related violent crimes (Cacas, 33). Figures released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show that 7,684 hate crimes motivated by race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation were reported in 1993, up from 6,623 the previous year. Of those crimes in 1993, 62 percent were racially motivated (Cacas, 32). Certainly, this is a problem the nation must address. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States and both the Wisconsin and federal governments have chosen to address this problem in a way that is grossly unconstitutional. ?Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise therof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.? The most obvious arguments against the Mitchell decision are those dealing with the First Amendment. In fact, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the state statute was unconstitutional in their decision, which the U.S. Supreme Court overruled. The Wisconsim Supreme Court argued that the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute, ?violates the First Amendment directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed offensive thought.? The Wisconsin Court also rejected the state?s argument ?that the statute punishes only the conduct? of intentional selection of a victim?. The Court?s contention was that ? the statute punishes the because of? aspect of the defendant?s selection, the reason the defendant selected the victim, the motive behind the selection.? The law is in fact a direct violation of the First Amendment, according to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which said ?the Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees.If there is a bedrock principal underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable?. The Supreme Court was heard to utter such noble phrases as recently as 1989, in Texas v. Johnson. Unfortunately these idealistic principles seem to have been abandoned during Wisconsin v. Mitchell. Sleep deprevation EssayPossibly more important, and certainly more recent, is the precedent established in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, a 1992 case. This case involved a juvenille who was convicted under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for burning a cross in the yard of a black family that lived across the street from the petitioner. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, but the Court was divided in its opinions for overturning the St. Paul statute. Scalia argued that the city ordinance was overbroad, because it punished nearly all controversial characterizations likely to arouse resentment among defined protected groups, and under-inclusive, because the government must not selectively penalize fighting words directed at some groups while not prosecuting those addressed to others, which is where the problem lies in the logic of the Mitchell decision. Though Rehnquist argued that Wisconsin v. Mitchell did not overturn R.A.V. v. St. Paul, If a hate speech law that enumerated some categories is invalid because, in Justice Antonin Scalias opinion in St. Paul, government may not regulate use based on hostility- or favoritism- toward the underlying message involved, how can a hate crime law be upheld that increases the penalty for crimes motivated by some hates but not those motivated by other hates? In other words, if the St. Paul statute is determined to be under-inclusive, how can we include every conceivable hate within the context of any statute. To be consistent, legislatures must now include other categories, including sex, physical characteristics, age, party affiliation, anti-Americanism or position on abortion.(Feingeld, 16)More interesting (and Constitutional) than the majority opinion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, is the concurring opinion written by Justice White, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice OConnor join. White writes, Although the ordinance as construed reaches egories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that- however repugnant- is shielded by the First Admendment Our fighting words cases have made clear, however, that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected The ordinance is therefore fatally overbroad and invalid on its face Rehnquist argues that whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at expression, the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, had Mitchell not stated, There goes a white boy; go get him, his sentence would not have been enhanced, he would have instead received the maximum sentence of two years in jail for his crime, instead of four. Therefore, the Wisconsin statute does not only punish conduct, as Justice Rehnquist suggests, but speech as well. The Wisconsin v. Mitchell decision cannot simply be viewed as one that does harm to racists and homophobics. There are much broader costs to society than the quieted opinions of an ignorant few. First, laws which chill thought or limit expression detract from the goal of insuring the availability of the broadest possible range of ideas and expressions in the marketplace of ideas. Second, the Mitchell ruling not only affects eveyones free speech rights with a general constriction of the interpretation of the First Amendment, but the ruling makes way for further constrictions. Third, penalty enhancement laws place the legislature in the position of judging and determining the quality of ideas, and assumes that the government has the capacity to make such judgements. Fourth, without the expression of opinions generally deemd unacceptable by society, society tends to forget why those opinions were deemed unacceptable in the first place. (More specifically, nothing makes a skinhead seem m ore stupid than allowing him to voice his opinion under the scrutiny of a national television audience.) Finally, when society allows the free expression of all ideas, regardless of its disdain for those ideas, it is a sign of strength. So when a society uses all its power to suppress ideas, it is certainly a sign of that societys weakness (Gellman, (381-385). The United States Supreme Courts unanimous decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell is incorrect for a number of reasons. Constitutionally, the decision fails to comply with the freedom of speech guaranteed in the First Amendment, and the guarantee to all citizens of equal protection under the laws, listed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision also arguably overturns R.A.V. v. St. Paul, and suggests that the Court may be leaning towards a new fighting words doctrine, where unpopular speech equals unprotected speech. The decision also damages societ as a whole in ways that are simply immeasureable in their size, such as those listed in the preceding paragraph. Wisconsin v. Mitchell is a terribly flawed Supreme Court decision, which one can only hope will be overturned in the very near future. The freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere sahdow of a freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion -Justice Jackson in W.V. Board of Education. v. BarnetteBibliography Cacas, Samuel. Hate Crime Sentences Can Now Be Enhanced Under A New Federal Law. Human Rights 22 (1995): 32-33Feingold, Stanley. Hate Crime Legislation Muzzles Free Speech. The National Law Journal 15 (July 1, 1993): 6, 16Gellman, Susan. Sticks And Stones. UCLA Law Review 39 (December, 1991): 333-396Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire R.A.V. v. St. PaulTexas v. JohnsonU.S. v. OBrienWisconsin v. MitchellWooley v. MaynardW.V. State Board of Education v. Barnette